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By WHITNEY E. FRASER TIEDEMANN*
The patent system added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.
-Abraham Lincoln
THE UNITED STATES PATENT system provides inventors with an
incentive to publicly disclose their inventions in order to effectively
promote the innovation of new technology. The system was designed
to address the tension that, although innovation is best promoted by
bringing inventions into the public arena early to allow others to use
and expand on the new idea, inventors will not be motivated to dis-
close their inventions to the public unless they receive a benefit for
doing so.' The United States patent system provides a benefit by
granting the inventor a period of market exclusivity for the inven-
tion.2 Thus, the patent system promotes innovation by requiring pub-
lic disclosure while compensating the inventor with certainty of
protection against unauthorized use of the invention.
The current United States patent system does a fairjob of encour-
aging innovation, but room for improvement still exists-specifically
in the present manner of determining inventorship priority. The
United States relies on a first-to-invent priority system, in which a pat-
ent is awarded to the party to show conception of an idea coupled
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Review, Volume 41; Registered Patent Agent. The author would like to thank her editor,
Caryn Nutt, whose insight and diligence helped shape this Comment from beginning to
end. The author would also like to thank her fianc6, Bryan McCollum, and her parents, Al
and Nancy, whose unending supply of faith and support make anything seem possible.
1. Stephen G. Kunin et al., Reach-Through Claims in the Age of Biotechnology, 51 AM. U.
L. REv. 609, 615-16 (2002) ("The Founding Fathers of this nation felt strongly that re-
warding innovation in exchange for public disclosures would make the country prosper.").
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (granting the patentee the right to exclude
others from "making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention").
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with reduction to practice of that idea before another.3 This system
does not adequately promote early public disclosure and certainty of
protection and has proven particularly burdensome for the biotech-
nology industry, where scientists often work toward similar research
goals.4
For example, many companies and institutions are currently
working diligently to discover a cure for diabetes.5 Imagine that,
within a three month period, two separate institutions independently
discover a critical step in the islet cell transplantation process, 6 mak-
ing the procedure ninety percent effective in treating patients with
Type One diabetes. Company A ("A") makes the discovery first, but
delays in filing the patent application.7 Company B ("H') makes the
same discovery three months after A and immediately files in the
United States and abroad for a patent on the process. B begins the
rigorous process of prosecuting the patent, spending approximately
$10,000 upfront in preparation for prosecution. 8 Upon learning that
3. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2000).
4. DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA PATENTING 1
(2004). The National Institute of Health filed patents on thousands of gene fragments in
1994 attempting to undercut efforts by private parties to patent those sequences. Id.
5. The research institutions include: The Islet Foundation, Joslin Diabetes Center,
and the Diabetes Institutes Foundation, among others. See, e.g., The Islet Foundation,
http://www.islet.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2007);Joslin Diabetes Center, http://joslin.org/
ResearchIndexjl186.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); Diabetes Institutes Foundation,
http://www.dif.org/research/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
6. "Islets are clusters of cells in the pancreas that make insulin." American Diabetes
Association, Islet Transplantation, http://www.diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes/islet-trans-
plants.jsp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). The islet cells of a Type One diabetic no longer
produce insulin, requiring the patient to take multiple insulin injections each day to pro-
cess sugar. American Diabetes Association, Type One Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/
type-l-diabetes.jsp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). The islet transplantation process takes islet
cells from a donor pancreas and implants the cells into a diabetic pancreas. American
Diabetes Association, Islet Transplantation, supra. A successful implant allows the pancreas
to make insulin using the new islet cells. Id.
7. An applicant may delay in filing an application in order to refine an invention, to
determine the commercial viability of an invention, or just by spending time in prepara-
tion for filing. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), an applicant has a grace period in which an
invention may be in "public use or on sale" for up to one year before the applicant is
barred from filing for a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also infra note 8.
8. See Benjamin Hershkowitz, Maximizing Your Patent Prosecution Dollars, 4 L.J.
NEWSLS. PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1, Chart A (2003) available at http://www.kenyon.com/
files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/62/Dollars.pdf. The primary costs associated with ob-
taining a patent are the legal fees for preparing an application and filing it with the
USPTO. Id. at 1. A company will also want to do a prior art search before filing to ensure
that the invention is not anticipated by another patent or publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 102
(setting out the boundaries of prior art, including: knowledge or use of the invention in
the United States before the date of invention, a patent on the invention or description of
the invention in literature anywhere in the world, public use or sale of the invention in the
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no known prior art exists to impede the issuance of the patent, B solic-
its investor support for the development, approval, and implementa-
tion of the process. In the meantime, A files its own patent application
for the same process. The examiner at the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") rejects A's application as anticipated by
B's. A then initiates an interference proceeding against B, asserting
priority of inventorship.
Under the current first-to-invent patent system in the United
States, if A could demonstrate that it created the identical cell trans-
plantation process three months before B, A would gain priority as the
first inventor, effectively making B's discovery and timely public disclo-
sure worthless.9 It will be difficult for B to find investors to contribute
to the development of a product with no economic value in the
United States. While both companies made the same discovery inde-
pendently of each other within a short period of time, A will reap the
benefits of the invention in the United States because of prior discov-
ery, despite the fact that B brought the information to the public ear-
lier. This result runs counter to the goal of promoting progress
through early public disclosure.
In June 2005, Congressperson Lamar Smith addressed these con-
cerns with the introduction the Patent Reform Act of 2005 ("Patent
Reform Act"). 10 Smith introduced the Patent Reform Act as a means
United States for more than a year before the filing of the application in the United States,
abandonment of the invention, the existence of a patent on the invention by the applicant
in another country more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the
United States, a failure of claimed inventor to actually invent the subject matter claimed in
the application, or invention by another party before the applicant). A prior art search can
cost up to $1000. See Bay Area Intellectual Property Group, http://www.bayareaip.com/
Search-flat/Search-flat.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); STO's Prior Art Search Services,
http://www.bustpatents.com/prior.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
9. As all other countries operate under a first-to-file system, B would still have the
patent on the cell transplantation process in other countries. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The
US. First-To-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage To Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'y 425, 425 n.1 (2002). This would result in B's invention having no value in
the United States, and A being unable to protect the patented cell transplantation system
abroad. See Roland H. Schwillinski & Benjamin Hershkowitz, Are Major Changes in Store for
the U.S. Patent System?, IP ADVISOR 1 (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.goodwinprocter.
com/Publications.aspx (follow "Find a Publication" hyperlink, then search by date and
publication type). The United States is currently the only country operating under a first-
to-invent patent system. Id.
10. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). Co-sponsors include:
Rep. Lamar Smith (TX-21), Rep. Howard Berman (CA-28), Rep. Rick Boucher (VA-9),
Rep. Chris Cannon (UT-3), Rep. John Carter (TX-31), Rep. Howard Coble (NC-6), Rep.
John Conyers, Jr. (MI-14), Rep. Bob Goodlatte (VA-6), Rep. Darrell Issa (CA-49), Rep.
Zoe Lofgren (CA-16), Rep. Michael McCaul (TX-10), and Rep Adam Schiff (CA-29).
THOMAS, H.R. 2795 Cosponsors, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR
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to "eliminate legal gamesmanship from the current system that re-
wards lawsuit abuses over creativity ... [and] enhance the quality of
patents and increase public confidence in their legal integrity."1' The
sponsors of the Patent Reform Act sought to address three concerns:
the decrease in patent quality, the increase in litigation abuses, and
the desire to further harmonize the United States patent laws with the
patent laws of other countries. 12 The Patent Reform Act would make
various reforms to the current United States patent system, including
a shift from the current first-to-invent system to the more practical
first-to-file system of patent priority.13
This Comment supports the proposal that the United States move
to a first-to-file inventorship system, awarding a patent to the first
party to file for a patent on the invention. Under a first-to-file system,
inventors claiming the right to a patent in the United States would no
longer need to undergo difficult and costly proceedings to determine
who invented first. If adopted, the United States inventorship system
would support the constitutional goal of the patent system-the pro-
motion of progress through innovation-by awarding priority of in-
ventorship to the first party to file a patent application for the
invention, bringing the invention to the public earlier. 14
This Comment will illustrate that moving to a first-to-file system of
priority would greatly benefit the biotechnology industry and the
United States patent system. A first-to-file system would promote the
innovative goals of the patent system by encouraging early public dis-
closure and providing greater certainty of protection. Through the
lens of the biotechnology industry, this Comment will show that the
technological future of innovation hinges upon the benefits afforded
2795:@@@P; Bay Area Intellectual Property Group, http://www.bayareaip.com/Search-
flat/Searchjflat.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
11. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R 2795, the "Patent Act of 2005" Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Senator Lamar Smith), available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/media/pdfs/printers/ 109th/21655.pdf.
12. Id. at 3 (statement of Senator Howard Berman).
13. These reforms include: changing the patent priority system from a first-to-invent
to a first-to-file system, eliminating the best mode requirement, imposing a duty of candor
and good faith on all persons involved in patent proceedings, limiting damages for in-
fringement, limiting a patentee's ability to get an injunction, requiring increased regula-
tion of continuation applications, instituting a post-grant opposition procedure, imposing
an eighteen-month publication requirement that applicants cannot opt out of, and al-
lowing third parties to submit prior art. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong.
(2005); see also Public Knowledge, H.R. 2795: The Patent Reform Act of 2005, http://www
.publicknowledge.org/issues/hr2795.
14. See H.R. 2795 § 3; Schwillinski & Hershkowitz, supra note 9.
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by the first-to-file system. It will dispel the concerns associated with the
first-to-file system of priority and demonstrate that the purposes of
early public disclosure and certainty are not effectuated through the
current first-to-invent system.
Part I provides an overview of the biotechnology industry and the
United States patent system, arguing that the first-to-file system will be
more beneficial to this emerging and innovative field. Part II discusses
the advantages a first-to-file system would provide for the United
States patent system as a whole, identifying the promotion of early
public disclosure and certainty and dispelling concerns about the first-
to-file system. Part III concludes that the current system of priority
provides inadequate patent protection for both the emerging field of
biotechnology and all other patentable subject matter.
I. Biotechnology and the United States Patent System: The
Emerging Fields of Innovation Are Incompatible with
the First-to-Invent System of Issuing Patents
Intellectual property protection encompasses rights relating to lit-
erary, artistic, and scientific works, inventions, and designs. 15 The in-
tellectual property doctrine, developed by philosophers and legal
scholars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, provides the
foundation for these rights.1 6 Under the doctrine, an inventor or au-
thor is entitled to the property rights of his intellectual creation.17
The intellectual property doctrine influenced the founders of this
country when they drafted Article One of the United States Constitu-
tion to provide the basis for the United States patent system.18 The
clause, which states, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries," 19 seeks to
balance the public good served by early disclosure of scientific and
artistic progression with the need to reward the innovator as an incen-
tive for disclosing creations. 20
Because an inventor must fully disclose an invention in order to
obtain patent protection, the inventor may lose a competitive advan-
15. Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First-to-File Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L.
REv. 67, 69 (1997).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. Id.
20. Kunin, supra note 1, at 616.
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tage as a result of the disclosure. 21 Thus, the patent system provides
the inventor with an incentive to disclose in the form of exclusivity. A
patent grants the holder "the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States." 22 In
exchange, the government requires that the inventor provide a "writ-
ten description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the
same . "..."23 This exchange of exclusivity for disclosure is based on
the belief that the public knowledge resulting from the disclosure of
the invention will lead to future progress and innovation.
As one of the "fastest growing industrial sectors in the United
States," the biotechnology industry relies heavily on strong patent pro-
tection for both investor support and sustainability. 24 The most valua-
ble assets a biotechnology company holds are the ideas that turn into
products; potential investors want to see forward-thinking product
ideas that will evolve into profitable products. 25 Because biotechnol-
ogy companies are built upon a foundation of ideas, the companies
must protect their intellectual property as diligently as possible. 26 As
patents provide the strongest form of intellectual property protec-
21. For some inventions, it may be more advantageous from a business perspective to
not disclose an invention to the world. See IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PAT-
ENT SYSTEM § 1:7 (Thomson/West 2006) (1998). An inventor may choose to keep her in-
vention a secret and receive protection under a state's trade secret laws. See, e.g., CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 3426.1, 3426.2 (West 1997). The downside of opting for trade secret protection is
that the protection lasts only as long as the invention remains a secret, and does not pro-
tect an inventor from others who independently create the same thing or reverse engineer
the invention. COOPER, supra, § 1:7.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000). The term of exclusivity provided by the patent grant is
twenty years. Id. This limited monopoly allows the inventor to retain the sole rights to the
invention and the financial gains associated with those rights for the term of the patent-a
necessary tradeoff to promote innovation.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
24. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318 (2006) (arguing against many of the reforms proposed by the
Patent Reform Act); Kunin, supra note 1, at 615.
25. Kunin, supra note 1, at 615 ("In order to raise the necessary funds, companies
need to be as forward thinking as possible during the research and development phase.").
26. Id. ("[C] ompanies need to leverage technological innovation to garner sustaining
investments.").
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tion, 27 biotechnology companies rely on the strength of their patents
to attract investors and recoup investments. 28
The nature of biotechnology innovation is such that it requires a
significant investment of time and money with little guarantee that an
invention will produce a capital return.29 If and when an invention
does produce useful results, the window of time for remaining patent
protection is very small. 30 Thus, it is essential that companies produc-
ing viable inventions receive substantial protection from use of those
inventions by others. Strong protection allows the inventing company
to earn back the time and resources it invested in developing the in-
novation. The first-to-file priority system adds an element of certainty
to a patent by eliminating the possibility of future invalidation, while
maintaining the goals of the patent system by encouraging early
disclosure.
A. The Biotechnology Industry
Biotechnology involves the use of biological processes to produce
valuable medical and industrial materials.3 1 The first instances of bio-
technology occurred when humans learned to breed plants and ani-
mals with desirable characteristics to produce better crops and
livestock.3 2 Increased understanding of Mendelian genetics and the
role of genetic mutation led to breakthroughs in the use of genetic
engineering. 33
Genetic engineering often involves the use of biological tools,
such as a phage3 4 or a plasmid, 35 to introduce foreign DNA into host
27. Id. at 610.
28. "Without patents... there would be no biotech industry and no innovative drug
development." Id. at 610 n.4 (citing Charles Craig, Current Public Policy Challenges, CONVER-
GENCE, THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY REPORT, 2000, at 65).
29. The cost of bringing a new drug to market is approximately $500 million. John K.
Borchardt, The Business ofPharmacogenomics, 4 MOD. DRUG DISCOVERY 35 (July 2001). The
probability of an idea turning into a new drug, however, is very slim. See Kunin, supra note
1, at 614 ("For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, for every 5,000 to 10,000 com-
pounds screened there are about 250 lead candidates in pre-clinical testing, and of these,
only one is likely to become a Food and Drug Administration ["FDA"] approved drug.").
30. "It may take as long as thirteen years from initial screening to FDA approval,
thereby hindering any quick return on investment." Kunin, supra note 1, at 614. Because a
patent term is for twenty years from the date of filing, a company may have as little as seven
years of protection after FDA approval. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
31. BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 179 (8th ed. 2004).
32. See COOPER, supra note 21, § 1:1.
33. Id.
34. A phage is a type of virus that specifically infects bacteria. A temperate phage is
useful in genetic engineering because it will not always kill its host. Instead, the genetic
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cells. 36 The introduction of the foreign DNA guarantees that, under
the right circumstances, the host cells will cause the foreign DNA to
replicate, allowing for the expression of that DNA.3 7 The genetically-
engineered organism then becomes unique, expressing characteristics
that would not exist in the organism without the engineering. 38
Although many public-policy debates have arisen concerning ge-
netic engineering-some critics fear the creation of new pathogens,
while others express concern over the application of genetic-engineer-
ing techniques to humans 9-the benefits of the research significantly
outweigh the potential harms. 40 One example of the benefit provided
by life-altering innovation in the biotechnology industry is the conver-
sion of bacteria into a metabolic factory to make human insulin. 4 1
This was the first product Genetech created as an emerging biotech-
nology firm in the early 1980s. 4 2 Genetech licensed the technology to
Eli Lilly and Company for manufacturing, revolutionizing the treat-
ment of diabetes, and making the use of the less effective animal insu-
lin obsolete. 43
material of the temperate phage will become integrated into the host's genome. This al-
lows for the creation of organisms with the desired characteristics. Id. § 1:3.
35. A plasmid is a small genetic component existing outside of a chromosome. Plas-
mids often carry genes that control the production of toxins, antibiotic resistance, or unu-
sual metabolic ability. Conjugative plasmids are useful in genetic engineering because they
can transfer DNA by conjugation. Thus, plasmids with desirable characteristics can insert
those characteristics into select organisms. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 1:7.
40. Id. Some concerns associated with the use of genetic technology include: the exis-
tence of new allergens in food resulting from transgenic crops, the production of new
toxins by genetically engineered organisms, and the imposition of environmental harms
associated with the possible transfer of introduced genes between plants. See Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, Risks of Genetic Engineering, http://www.ucsusa.org/food-andenvi-
ronment/genetic-engineering/risks-of-genetic-engineering.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2007). Some of the beneficial results of genetic technology include: the production of
environmental clean-up products that use pollution-eating microbes to clean up hazardous
waste more effectively than chemical pesticides; the use of DNA finger printing in criminal
investigations, forensic medicine, anthropology, and wildlife management; and a reduced
reliance on chemical pesticides. See Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology
Industry Facts, http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.asp?p=yes (last visited Feb.
18, 2007).
41. See U.S. Patent No. 4,421,685 (filed May 11, 1981) (issued Dec. 20, 1983).
42. Robert L. McCown & George L. Coffman, Development of Biotechnology Curriculum
for the Biomanufacturing Industry, 22 PHARMACEUTICAL ENGINEERING 1 (2002), available at
http://www.ispe.org/galleries/campusconnection-files/02MJ-Coffman.pdf.
43. Id.
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Breakthrough research in the field of biotechnology comes at
substantial financial cost; the industry spends tens of billions of dollars
on research and development each year.44 The innovation resulting
from this research is often considered a significant contribution to the
field, providing a product or process that can be widely used through-
out the industry.45 The industry has developed and marketed more
than 350 medicines used to treat or cure hundreds of millions of pa-
tients.46 In 2002 alone, the USPTO granted 7763 patents to the bio-
technology industry.47 In addition, the biotechnology sector filed over
40,000 new biotechnology patent applications in the 2003 fiscal year.48
Because the cost of biotechnology innovation is so high, the need for
adequate and efficient patent protection is essential to encourage in-
vestment in life-changing research.
In 1980, the biotechnology industry experienced a breakthrough
in patent protection for genetically-engineered inventions. In a
landmark decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,49 the Supreme Court al-
lowed for the patenting of living things.50 Chakrabarty genetically
modified a strain of bacteria to efficiently break down oil, useful in
remedying the harmful effects of an oil spill.51 The patent office de-
nied the application, stating that the bacteria fell under the "product
44. See Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology Industry Facts, supra note
40. The biotechnology industry is one of the most research-intensive industries in the
world, spending $17.9 billion on research and development in 2003. Id.
45. It is not uncommon for licensing agreements to exist between companies in the
same industry to allow for easier use of advanced technology. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST § 34.2a (2006).
46. A. Scott Whitaker, Biotechnology Industry Organization Letter on Patent Reform
(May 12, 2005), http://www.bio.org/ip/action/20050513.pdf. For example, nine million
children that would have died in 1974 from vaccine-preventable diseases do not die today
due to the increased number and availability of vaccines. See Robert Bazell et al., 21stC
Biotechnology Forum, Biotechnology in 2018: How will genetic science and technology change the
world?, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/21stC/issue-3.3/forumall.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2006).
47. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology Industry Facts, supra note
40. The USPTO issued 167,334 foreign and United States patents in 2002. U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, Calendar Year 2002 Patent Counts by Patent Type and by State and
Country of Origin, http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/stco_02.htm.
48. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to HR. 2795 the "Patent Act of 2005": Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 27 (Sept. 15, 2005) (statement of Robert B. Chess, Executive Chairman, Necktar
Therapeutics, Testifying on Behalf of the Biotechnology Industry Organization), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/23434.pdf [hereinafter Chess,
Hearing].
49. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
50. Id. at 310.
51. Id. at 305.
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of nature" exception to patentability. 52 The Supreme Court reversed,
declaring that a "manufacture" under 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes "any-
thing under the sun that is made by man," including a microorga-
nism.53 Since Chakrabarty, living-organism patentability has been
extended from single-celled organisms to multicellular organisms.54
In fact, the only living organism that appears beyond the reach of a
patent is a human being. 55
Chakrabarty marked the beginning of the biotechnology patent
boom. 56 In the ensuing years, biotechnology has changed rapidly as
an industry, exhibiting tremendous innovative potential. 57 Biotechnol-
ogy inventions require a significant amount of time and expense up-
front,58 and most companies do not have the unlimited resources
necessary to continuously develop new inventions without the security
of a return. The exclusivity offered by a patent helps compensate the
patent holder for the time and effort invested in the inventing pro-
cess. 59 Without exclusive rights, non-inventors could freely make, use,
and sell the invention at a significantly lower price than the inven-
tor.60 While the inventor must price the item or license the invention
to cover the costs of research and development as well as the costs of
manufacture, the non-inventor must only cover the costs of manufac-
ture. 61 Without exclusivity, inventors and companies would be in the
52. Id. at 306. A product of nature is not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because it does not constitute a machine, composition of matter, or manufacture. 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1:1.02[7] (Matthew Bender
& Co. 2006) (1998).
53. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
54. Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22,
1984) (patent granted for a genetically-altered mouse).
55. In December 1997, Dr. Stuart Newman filed a patent application claiming human-
animal chimeras. The Patent Office rejected the claims because they encompassed human
beings. Warren D. Woessner, Patenting Transgenic Animals-From the Harvard Mouse to "Hello
Dolly," 1999, http://www.slwk.com/CM/IPPapers/IPPapersl2.asp.
56. Chess, Hearing, supra note 48, at 25. "It is safe to say that most, if not all, of the
revolutionary medical advances developed by the biotechnology industry would not exist
had the U.S. Supreme Court not ruled in 1980 that biotechnology inventions were entitled
to patent protection." Id.
57. See id.
58. ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 11 (3d ed. 2003). See also Kunin, supra note 1, at 610 ("Companies are investing ap-
proximately $400-$500 million in researching, developing, and bringing to market new
technologies that will raise people's standard of living, improve quality of life, reduce suf-
fering, and promote longevity.").
59. MERGES, supra note 58, at 610.
60. Id. at 11-12.
61. Id.
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undesirable position of being unable to recoup the expenses of their
investment.62
A patent's grant of exclusivity is meaningless unless a patent
owner can be certain that another party will not challenge owner-
ship.63 The current first-to-invent system of patent priority does not
adequately protect the innovations arising out of the biotechnology
industry. Under the current priority system, ownership is never certain
because a prior inventor could theoretically always exist, having in-
vented first but not filed accordingly. This level of uncertainty is dan-
gerous for the biotechnology industry, as the industry relies heavily on
their intellectual property for existence. 64 Due to the nature of the
industry, the strongest possible patent protection is essential to keep
up with the innovative and industrial demands of biotechnology. A
patent holder needs certainty that its intellectual property will be pro-
tected so investors will continue to invest and the necessary research
and development can go forward. 65 Biotechnology companies invest
so much into an invention that they cannot risk that a patent will be
invalidated years after it is granted due to a priority of inventorship
dispute. Overall, the first-to-file system provides better protection for
the patent holder, thus supporting the innovative purpose of the pat-
ent system.
B. Determining Priority Under the Current Patent Act and the
Patent Reform Act
Under the current United States patent laws, inventorship is
awarded to the party able to prove the earliest date of invention. 66
Inventive priority is typically awarded to the inventor who first reduces
an embodiment of the invention to practice. 67
62. "Patents provide the needed assurance for investors to risk the capital necessary in
the long development process; e.g. that his/her investment cannot only be recouped but
also generate a profit." Biotechnology Industry Organization, Intellectual Property Over-
view, http://www.bio.org/ip/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
63. Chess, Hearing, supra note 48, at 25 ("[P]erhaps no other industry is as dependent
upon patents as is the biotechnology industry.").
64. See supra notes 56-62, for a discussion of the importance of patent protection in
the biotechnology industry.
65. "Without the certainty that comes from knowing that an invention discovered
10-15 years prior to coming to market can be protected, there would be little incentive for
investors to fund high risk biotechnology products." Chess, Hearing, supra note 48, at 26.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2000).
67. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 10.03[1]; JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCrlON TO
PATENT LAw 163 (2003). Reduction to practice can be actual or constructive. MUELLER,
supra, at 163. "Actual reduction to practice occurs when a physical embodiment of the
invention has been constructed that works for its intended purpose." Id. The filing of a
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Two exceptions to this general rule exist. The first exception al-
lows an inventor to claim priority over another if he conceived first
but reduced to practice last only if he exercised reasonable diligence
between conception and reduction to practice. 68 A showing of reason-
able diligence requires inventors to demonstrate that they diligently
pursued the invention from the time of the first party's reduction to
practice to the inventor's own reduction to practice. 69 Since the pat-
ent system favors early public disclosure, and this exception awards
priority to the inventor who delayed in disclosing the invention, rea-
sonable diligence is a difficult standard to meet.7
0
The second exception to the general priority rule allows an inven-
tor who reduced an invention to practice after another inventor to
claim priority if the first inventor abandoned, suppressed, or con-
cealed his invention. 71 Abandonment, suppression, and concealment
is determined by examination of three areas: the length of the delay
period, the existence and nature of any activity during the period of
delay, and the cause for resumption of activity.72 This exception sup-
ports the public disclosure purpose of the patent system; patent pro-
tection is designed not only to encourage innovation, but also to allow
the public to enjoy the benefits of the technology. 73
Priority under the current patent system is challenged through
an interference proceeding. 74 An interference proceeding has seven
parts: "(a) declaration of the interference; (b) a motion period and
filing of preliminary statements; (c) discovery; (d) a testimony period
or periods; (e) a hearing; (f) judgment; and (g) court review." 75 In
order to show priority of inventorship, parties are required to present
evidence as to conception, reduction to practice, and diligence. 76 Due
patent application in compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 acts as constructive reduction to
practice of an invention. Id.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1); see also CHISUM, supra note 52, § 10.03[1].
69. Hunter v. Beissbarth, 230 U.S.P.Q. 365, 368 (B.P.A.I. 1986).
70. Id.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1).
72. CHISUM, supra note 52, § 10.08[1].
73. Id. § 10.08[1].
74. Id. § 10.09[1] [a]. "The purpose of an interference proceeding is to resolve the
question of priority of invention when more than one applicant seeks a patent on substan-
tially the same invention." Id.
75. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); CHISUM, supra note 52, § 10.09[1] [c].
76. CHISUM, supra note 52, § 10.09[1] [a]. Evidence of conception may be shown by
"written descriptions, drawings, or a model." Id. § 10.04[2] [b]. Sometimes, "oral testimony
by the inventor and corroborating witnesses without supporting documentary or tangible
evidence may be sufficient to establish prior conception." Id. To show actual reduction to
practice, "an inventor must not only construct an embodiment of the invention (or per-
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to the many factors involved, a challenge to determine priority of in-
ventorship under the current system requires parties to provide a sig-
nificant amount of data to show their relative dates of conception and
reduction to practice. 7 7
The movement to a first-to-file priority system, as suggested in the
Patent Reform Act, would eliminate the cumbersome inventorship re-
quirements, specifically, the production of evidence to establish tim-
ing of conception and reduction to practice, by awarding a patent to
the first to file an application for an invention. 78 Specifically, the Pat-
ent Reform Act would change the priority system by making an earlier
filed patent prior art,79 effectively barring the issuance of any subse-
quently filed patent.8 0 The Patent Reform Act would amend 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 to state:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained if ... the
claimed invention was patented ... before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention... or... the claimed invention was described in a
patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent
published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which
the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inven-
tor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention.8 1
form the steps of a process) but must also test the device or process so as to establish its
capacity to perform successfully its intended purpose." Id. § 10.06(2] [a]. To establish dili-
gence, "the inventor must account for the entire critical period by showing either activity
aimed at reduction to practice or legally adequate excuses for inactivity." Id. § 10.07.
77. Id. § 10.09[1][c].
For those subject to challenge under first-to-invent, the proceeding is costly and
often very protracted; frequently it moves from a USPTO administrative proceed-
ing to full court litigation. In both venues it is not only evidence of who first
reduced the invention to practice that is at issue but also questions of proof of
conception, diligence, abandonment, suppression, and concealment, some of
them requiring inquiry into what an inventor through and when the inventor
thought it.
COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 125-26 (Stephen A. Merrill, et al. eds.
2004) [hereinafter A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY].
78. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (2005).
79. Prior art is "the legally available technology and information with which the
claimed invention will be compared, in order to determine whether that invention is pat-
entable." MUELLER, supra note 67, at 139.
80. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (2005).
81. Id. (emphasis added). The current first-to-invent rule is embodied in 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) (2000), which states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless .. . (g) (1) during the course of an
interference conduct under section 135 or section 291, another inventor involved
therein establishes ... that before such person's invention thereof the invention
was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed,
or (2) before such person's invention thereof, the invention was made in this
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The authors of the Patent Reform Act included this provision in
response to frustration associated with the unpredictability inherent
in a priority determination under the current first-to-invent system,
which creates uncertainty in patent ownership.82 The first-to-file sys-
tem would eliminate this unpredictability by increasing the reliability
of the priority process thus increasing the quality of issued patents
and encouraging investment in the patented product or research. As
Senator Berman stated during the House Committee hearing on the
bill, "[h]igh-quality patents are essential to a healthy patent system.
Poor-quality patents tend to spawn litigation; [sic] which in turn cre-
ates uncertainty in markets that depend on patent rights. As a result,
investors hesitate to invest; innovators hesitate to invent."8 3 The Patent
Reform Act addresses these concerns by embracing the first-to-file
movement, thereby increasing certainty in the patent system while up-
holding the innovative purpose of the patent system.
The purpose of the patent system is to promote early public dis-
closure, allowing the public to enjoy the benefit of the innovation in
exchange for the grant of exclusivity. However, the current first-to-
invent rule makes the process cumbersome and expensive, directly
conflicting with the system's intentions. Adopting the proposed first-
to-file rule would better promote the ultimate public-benefit purpose
of the United States patent system while increasing certainty in patent
protection. The greater certainty regarding the true owner of a patent
would lead to stronger patent protection and thus encourage innova-
tion and investment in essential industries, such as biotechnology.
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed
it.
Id.
82. The current system . . . frequently does not award patents to the first to in-
vent .... [A]n inventor can be the first to make the invention and first to file a
patent application, but still forfeit the right to a patent because the inventor can-
not sustain the cost of the "proof of invention" system.
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795 the "Patent Reform Act of 2005" Hearing on
H.R. 2795, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 109th Cong. 10
(2005) (statement of Gary L. Griswold, President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel,
3M Innovative Properties Company, on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association), available at h ttp: //judiciary.house.gov/ media/ pdfs/prin ters/109th / 21655.
pdf.
83. Id. at 3 (statement of Senator Howard Berman).
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II. A First-to-File System Promotes the Goals of the United
States Patent System, Positively Impacting the
Biotechnology Industry
Moving to a first-to-file system has been a topic of discussion
among patent reformists for a number of years. The first proposal oc-
curred in 1966, as a series of changes recommended by the Presi-
dent's Commission on the Patent System.84 Despite support at that
time from the USPTO for a first-to-file movement, the proposal was
rejected due to "widespread opposition from representatives of indus-
try, small business, individual inventors, and legal associations. '85 The
discussion arose again in the early 1990s as part of obligatory trade
negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
("GATT").86 While other reforms to the patent system resulted from
the negotiations,8 7 the United States remains the only country in the
world with a first-to-invent system. 88
In order to further the constitutional purpose of the patent sys-
tem-promotion of innovation-patent laws must allow for early pub-
lic disclosure as well as certainty of protection for inventors and their
creations. A movement to a first-to-file system of priority upholds the
purpose of the patent system by responding to each of these necessi-
ties. The system encourages early disclosure, by rewarding the first in-
ventor to disclose the innovation with exclusivity, and allows for
greater certainty, by eliminating cumbersome interference
proceedings.
84. Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 779, 781 (1991).
85. Id.
86. MERGES, supra note 58, at 171.
87. The reforms were the result of the GATT agreement called "Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property." Id. The reforms included: changing the patent term from
seventeen years from the date of issuance to twenty years from filing under 35 U.S.C. § 154
(2000); allowing inventive activity occurring in a World Trade Organization member coun-
try to be admitted to determine priority of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2000);
expanding the definition of infringement to include unauthorized offering for sale and
importing under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); and introducing a provisional application system
under 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000). Id.
88. Mossinghoff, supra note 9, at n.1. At the time of the GATT negotiations, only the
United States and the Philippines operated under a first-to-invent system. Id. The Philip-
pines switched to a first-to-file system on January 1, 1998. Id. Canada operated under a first-
to-invent system similar to the United States' until 1989. See Robin Coster, From First-to-
Invent to First-to-File: The Canadian Experience, 2, 7, available at http://www.torys.com/publi-
cations/pdf/ARTech-19T.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). At that time there was little con-
troversy in Canada over switching to a first-to-file system. Id. at 9.
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"Strong intellectual property protection is essential to the success,
and in some instances to the survival, of the over 1,200 biotechnology
companies in this country."89 The nature of the biotechnology indus-
try makes it dependent on its intellectual property. It may take a com-
pany ten or twenty years to develop a product that proves profitable. 90
For this reason, when a product is finally ready to go to market, the
company must be allowed an opportunity to recoup its long-term in-
vestment. 91 The exclusivity provided by the patent system provides this
opportunity. The system would work better, however, if there is more
certainty in the patent process so investors are confident in the
strength of their intellectual property.
A. The Certainty Afforded by the First-to-File System Promotes
Innovation
Under the current first-to-invent system, a patent holder can
never be completely safe in ownership of the patent because another
can always potentially invalidate the patent by showing priority of in-
vention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 92 The efficiency of the first-to-file
system remedies this problem by allowing for an immediate determi-
nation of priority.93 This change benefits both the patent office and
inventors, allowing the parties to simply look at the dates of filing to
determine priority, thus preventing long delays associated with costly
interference proceedings.9 4 These changes reduce administrative
tasks for the patent office and costly uncertainty for applicants. 95 In
the biotechnology industry, certainty is especially important because
investors rely on the viability of the product when investing; part of
the product's viability depends on whether the patent holder can ex-
89. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Intellectual Property Overview, supra note
62.
90. Chess, Hearing, supra note 48, at 25.
91. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing a biotechnology com-
pany's ability to recoup investments).
92. "No United States patent is totally immune from a challenge that it claims an
invention that another in fact invented earlier and therefore is invalid under 35 U.S.C.
Section 102(g)." William S. Thompson, Reforming the Patent System for the 21st Century, 21
AIPLA Q.J. 171, 181 (1993).
93. Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard in
Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA QJ. 193, 221 (1989).
94. See id.
95. See id.
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clude others from the invention and thereby recoup investments in
development.96
Most of the money raised by biotechnology companies is spent on
research and development. 97 Thus, the companies diligently protect
their intellectual property in order to gain a return on their invest-
ments.98 The biotechnology drug discovery process can take anywhere
from two to sixteen years. 99 Without the certainty that comes from
knowing that an invention discovered ten to fifteen years prior to
coming to market can be protected, there would be little incentive for
investors to fund high-risk biotechnology products.100
In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 1° 1 the Federal Circuit
Court upheld the validity of United States Patent Number 4,703,008
("the '008 patent") on isolated sequences of deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA") coding for Erythropoietin ("EPO"), a protein that stimulates
the production of red blood cells.10 2 This breakthrough case upheld
the patentability of isolated DNA sequences, prompting a race in the
96. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing a biotechnology com-
pany's ability to recoup investments).
97. Chess, Hearing, supra note 48, at 26. Specifically:
The vast majority of biotech companies spend more than 50 percent of their op-
erating expenses on research and development. This is due to the huge invest-
ments required to bring a product through the discovery and lead optimization
phase, preclinical testing, and the clinical trials required to gain market approval.
The total amount of spending to bring a successful product through commerciali-
zation is typically several hundred million dollars.
Id.
98. See id. As an example of invention returns relating to patents, Nektar Therapeu-
tics, in collaboration with Pfizer, developed Exubera®D, an inhaled insulin powder, which
was truly innovative as the first non-injectable insulin for diabetics. Id. "Upon word of the
issuance of the patent covering inhaled insulin in dry powder form, Nektar's stock valua-
tion increased by 20%." Id. The market increase helped attract the investment capital nec-
essary to bring the product to the FDA advisory committee approval. Id. Today, Exubera®
is approved for use by both Type One and Type Two diabetics in both the United States
and the European Union. See Nektar, Exubera®, http://www.nektar.com/wt/page/ex-
ubera (last visited Nov. 15, 2006). According to Robert Chess, Nektar's "story is similar to
the story of the hundreds of U.S. biotechnology companies in the United States." Chess,
Hearing, supra note 48, at 26.
99. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology Industry Facts, supra note
40.
100. See Chess, Hearing, supra note 48, at 26.
101. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at 1219. The defendants in Amgen also challenged the validity of the '008 pat-
ent based on priority of inventorship asserting that another scientist conceived of the strat-
egy used by Amgen's scientist to isolate the EPO gene. Id. at 1205. The Federal Circuit
judges had to review the priority determination of the district court, ultimately affirming
and finding that Amgen's scientist invented first. Id. at 1206-07. This is just a small exam-
ple of the inefficiency of priority challenges under the current first-to-invent system.
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genomic industry to quickly sequence and patent as many isolated
strands of DNA as possible.103 During this time, it is probable that
many parties applied for patents for the same DNA sequences. 0 4 Be-
tween 1976 and 2002, the USPTO issued over 16,000 patents on iso-
lated and purified DNA sequences or on processes used to identify,
isolate, copy, sequence, or analyze DNA sequences. 10 5 This large num-
ber of patents was due in part to the race to sequence the human
genome. 10 6 It is unknown how many parties have claimed duplicate
DNA sequences, but, because of the high number of applications on
DNA sequences, it is likely that multiple parties claimed inventorship
of the same sequence. These patents may be subject to priority pro-
ceedings under the current first-to-invent system, with evidence being
submitted on diligence in research, dates of conception and reduc-
tion to practice, and arguments of abandonment, suppression and
concealment. These costly interference proceedings will further strain
the USPTO's already tight resources. 10 7
Under the first-to-file system, however, a priority determination
could be made in a matter of minutes solely by referencing the appli-
cants's filing dates, thereby saving the USPTO's and the applicants's
time and money. In the example above, priority of inventorship for
the sequenced DNA applications would be relatively simple to estab-
lish, and parties could quickly ascertain whether their issued patent
would be subject to an inventorship challenge in the future. Under
the first-to-invent system, however, patents are subject to an inventor-
ship dispute at any time, thus making the patent validity uncertain for
the duration of the patent.'08
The uncertainty associated with the determination of priority can
be very costly, with legal fees from interference proceedings draining
millions of dollars from the biotechnology industry each year. 109 Inter-
103. Tom Abate, Biotech Firms Rushing to Patent Gene Fragments, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18,
1999, at B14, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/Chronicle/
archive/1999/10/18/BU17692.DTL.
104. Byron Spice, Genes May Become Big Business, PITrSBURG POST-GAZETrE, July 16,
2000, at AIO. "[S]o many patent applications have been filed that researchers joke that 800
percent of the human genome has been patented." Id.
105. DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME, A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA PATENTING 1
(2004).
106. See id. at 3.
107. See Schwillinski & Hershkowitz, supra note 9, at 1; Chess, Hearing, supra note 48, at
27.
108. Thompson, supra note 92, at 182 ("The potential for challenge based on inventor-
ship hangs over a patent throughout its life under the first to invent system.").
109. Jon F. Merz & Michelle R. Henry, The Prevalence of Patent Interferences in Gene Tech-
nology, 22 NATURE BIOTECH. 153 (2004).
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ference proceedings in gene discovery and biotechnology are more
prevalent than other areas of technology.110 Between 1998 and 2002,
the rate of interference declaration in the biotechnology/organic
chemistry sector of the patent office was "at least 2.5 times higher"
than the next leading industry; in fact, the average rate amounted to
6.5 times that of the other industries for that five-year period. I II Sev-
enty-five percent of these interference proceedings involved biotech-
nology applications.1 12 The high interference rate is likely attributable
to the strong competition, and often outright races, among compa-
nies working toward the same genetic discoveries. 1t 3 While certain
types of interference proceedings will remain in a first-to-file sys-
tem,1 14 the overall decrease in the number of proceedings will lead to
a higher degree of certainty under the first-to-file system and lower
the costs to the industry, allowing companies to invest more money
into research. The net effect of this change would be an increase in
the life-saving innovation researchers in biotechnology work toward
everyday.
The patent system would benefit as a whole from a first-to-file sys-
tem because inventors could ascertain with more certainty whether
their invention has been anticipated.' 5 It is easier to determine if an-
other party has filed earlier rather than invented earlier, since the fil-
ing date is clear, while the date of invention is not always known.
Innovators will likely be highly discouraged if they are issued a patent
that is subsequently deemed invalid for inventorship reasons when the
inventor had no way of knowing prior art existed. The first-to-file sys-
tem would avoid this costly and discouraging problem because a po-
tential applicant would be able to determine that no prior art exists
before filing a patent application. Armed with the knowledge that an
application for the same invention was not on file at the time of the
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Interferences that will remain in a first-to-file system: (1) derivation cases, (2) in-
ventorship disputes among former colleagues, (3) interfering cases naming the same in-
ventive entity but filed by different parties, (4) interleaving priorities, (5) improvidently
issued patents, and (6) cases having the same effective filing date. Charles L. Gholz, How
the U.S. Currently Handles the Interference Issues that Will Remain in a First-to-File World, 18
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2-13 (1990).
115. Thompson, supra note 92, at 182 ("The potential [for challenge based on in-
ventorship] is removed at the outset under the first to file system, giving clear title, which is
vital in the birth stage of product introduction.").
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first inventor's filing, the inventor is assured invested efforts will be
protected by the patent grant.
B. The First-to-File System Encourages Innovation by Rewarding
Inventors for Early Public Disclosure
The constitutional purpose of the patent system is the promotion
of "Progress in Science and useful Arts."'1 6 A first-to-file system pro-
motes the goals of the system by rewarding early filing and thus en-
sures earlier public disclosure of the invention.' 17 Such early public
disclosure is a vital step in promoting the constitutional goals of the
patent system. It facilitates further innovation, allowing other inven-
tors to create something new from the patented invention.' 18 Under a
first-to-file system of patent priority, the reward of a patent would al-
ways go to the inventor who first initiated the process of bringing the
invention into the public domain by filing a patent on the invention,
thereby fulfilling his or her role in promoting progress in the science
and useful arts. 119
Early public disclosure is essential to innovation because the ear-
lier a patent is disclosed, the sooner others can build on the technol-
ogy. A company should not be able to conceal its invention from the
public and then challenge the priority of another patent that discloses
an independent discovery of the same product or process and allows
the public to benefit from it.
In United States v. Duiblier Condensor Corp., 120 the Supreme Court
distinguished between an inventor's right to keep an invention secret
and an inventor's ability to receive a reward for disclosing the inven-
tion to the public.' 2 ' The Supreme Court artfully described the public
benefit encouraged by the patent system in Dubilier "An inventor de-
prives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but
gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of
human knowledge.... In consideration of its disclosure and the con-
sequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted." 122 The quid
pro quo nature of the United States patent system reflects the tension
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
117. Charles L. Gholz, First-to-File or First-to-Invent?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v
891, 895 (2000) [hereinafter Gholz, First-to-File].
118. Kunin, supra note 1, at 616 ("Each new discovery builds on the foundation laid by
those who came before it.").
119. See Gholz, First-to-File, supra note 117, at 895.
120. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
121. Id. at 186.
122. Id.
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inherent in facilitating the public purpose it was intended to serve-
that society will benefit if innovation is made available for public use,
but that inventors must be rewarded for disclosing innovation to the
public. A first-to-file system would support the means of early public
disclosure; because the first inventor to file is awarded the patent, the
system encourages inventors to file earlier, thus reinforcing the inno-
vative purpose of the patent system. The earlier an invention is filed
with the USPTO, the earlier the invention is disclosed and released to
the public.1 23
Early public disclosure is especially beneficial in the biotechnol-
ogy industry where many companies spend considerable time and re-
sources in pursuit of common research goals.1 24 Because the first-to-
file system promotes early filing and thus early public disclosure, re-
searchers working toward a common goal will be able to use and ex-
pand upon technology developed by competitors, which will
encourage innovation and discourage duplicative efforts.1 25 If a bio-
technology company becomes aware that a problem has been solved,
the company can stop investing time and resources into research that
will not provide the company with a return on its investment. The
company may then choose to redirect its efforts into another innova-
tion or begin building upon the new technology to create an even
greater invention.
For example, in Company A and Company B's hypothetical race
toward a cure for diabetes, B would get the patent grant under a first-
to-file system because B was the first to bring the invention to the pub-
lic. While A did not have an obligation to patent its invention, it
should not be able to reap the benefits of a patent if it decides to file
for patent protection after another has already disclosed the invention
to the public. A's delay in filing does not facilitate innovation through
public disclosure because B already disclosed the invention. Re-
warding A with a patent in this situation does not encourage public
123. Today, an invention is published within eighteen months of the application's ear-
lier effective filing date, unless the inventor is applying for a patent in a foreign country
and opts out of patenting in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000). Because the
first-to-file system would promote early filing, inventions would be disclosed to the public
eighteen months after that early filing. The Patent Reform Act also has a provision propos-
ing the removal of the opt-out publication exception. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R.
2795 § 9, 109th Cong. (2005). If this provision of the bill is adopted, then the publication
requirement would be an even stronger tool in the promotion of innovation.
124. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (providing an example of institutions
working toward a cure for diabetes).
125. See supra note 45 (discussing the common practice of licensing technology among
companies in an industry).
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disclosure; rather, it facilitates interferences and discourages B's fu-
ture innovation. Some may argue that this is an unfair result because
the first inventor to make a discovery was not rewarded for the inven-
tion. However, in light of the policies that the patent system seeks to
promote, this concern is misguided because, if the purpose of the pat-
ent system is to "promote scientific and technological progress by pro-
viding incentives for inventors, then it is not unfair to reward genuine
inventors for coming forward with their inventions by granting the
patent to the first inventor to do so."126
The promotion of early public disclosure, essential to innovation,
is best accomplished by the first-to-file system of priority. A first-to-file
system rewards those inventors who disclose their inventions, provid-
ing the public with notice of the technology and allowing them an
opportunity to expand upon it. Whereas the complexities involved in
the current first-to-invent system are a hindrance to the public policy
goals of the patent system, the simplicity of the first-to-invent system
supports those goals.
C. Dispelling the Myths of the First-to-File System
While a first-to-file system will undoubtedly create more certainty
in patent validity and bring inventions to the public earlier, a number
of concerns remain regarding its implementation. Those concerns,
however, are both outdated and unfounded. The first-to-file oppo-
nents take their arguments largely from the first-to-file debates that
occurred during the GATT negotiations. 127 In the years following
those debates, reforms to the patent procedures have mitigated many
of those concerns.
1. Myth #1: The First-to-File System Will Cause a Race to the
Patent Office
Many first-to-file opponents fear that a first-to-file system will
cause a race to the patent office so that an inventor may be on record
as the first to file an application. 128 The race to the patent office con-
cern centers around the idea that sloppy patents will be filed on in-
126. Robin Coster, From First-to-Invent to First-To-File: The Canadian Experience, 13-14,
available at http://www.torys.com/publications/pdf/ARTech-19T.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2006).
127. See supra note 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing the United States' rejec-
tion of the first-to-file system in the 1999 GATT negotiations).
128. Schwillinski & Hershkowitz, supra note 9, at 1 ("Opponents of a first-to-file system
often label it as a 'race-to-the-Patent Office' system.").
[Vol. 41
GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM
complete or frivolous ideas.' 29 According to those wary of a race to
the patent office, such a race will lead to a flood of incomplete appli-
cations.130 Opponents of the first-to-file system base this fear on an
assumption that people will quickly file patent applications to protect
their ideas, without fully considering or supporting the patentability
of the idea as an invention. 13' Because patent applications must "par-
ticularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter" re-
garded as the invention, 132 the fear is that applicants will rush to file
patents that do not meet the patentability requirements. The first-to-
file opponents argue that an application filed too quickly will not have
an adequate disclosure for patentability purposes.'3 3 The concern that
a race to the patent office will lead to sloppy applications is signifi-
candy weakened by recent changes to the patent-filing procedures. 134
The first policy to address the concern over sloppiness was the
implementation of a procedure by which a party may file a provisional
patent application at the patent office. 135 The provisional application
requires only a specification, one claim, and a drawing. 136 It allows an
applicant to guarantee a filing date without submitting a full utility
application. 137 The security provided by a provisional application al-
lows the applicant more quality time to draft the full utility application
in accordance with the patentability requirements without feeling
pressure to rush in order to secure a filing date. This one-year window
thus decreases the likelihood that an applicant will file a sloppy appli-
cation.1 38 Giving an applicant up to one year to perfect the utility ap-
plication does not affect the time of public disclosure because the
eighteen-month publication rule applies to the earliest effective filing
date, which would be the filing date of the provisional application.1 39
129. See Bob DeMatteis, Article, Professional Inventor's Alliance, http://www.piausa.
org/patent reform/articles/bobdematteis08_31_2005.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 2 (2000).
133. DeMatteis, supra note 129; see also A PA-ENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY, supra
note 77, at 126.
134. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Ex-
amination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg.
1 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2000).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the benefits of early publication).
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The second policy to address concerns over sloppiness is the
USPTO's changes to the practice of filing continuances on a patent
application. 140 Under a continued examination practice, applicants
may continue the examination of a patent after an examiner rejects it,
allowing the applicant to prolong the application process and gain
additional time to craft the claims for issuance. 141
Opponents of a first-to-file system fear that the applicants who file
too soon will tie up proceedings in the patent office with continuous
attempts to amend weak applications in order to meet patentability
standards, prolonging the process with multiple continuations. 142 The
concern raised by this approach is that multiple continuations under a
first-to-file system would not only make any issued patent weaker, due
to the constraints imposed by the initial application, 143 but would
make potential patent protection for another inventor of the same or
similar invention dependant upon the outcome of the proceedings of
the inventor who filed too quickly.
On January 3, 2006, the USPTO issued changes to the practice of
continuation filings in patent applications.' 44 Under continued exam-
ination practice, applicants may continue the examination of a patent
after an examiner rejects it, allowing the applicant additional time to
craft the claims for issuance. 145 Due to the additional time a continua-
tion adds to the examination of a patent application, the USPTO re-
vised the rules to require that an applicant support a second or
subsequent continued examination filing with a showing as to why the
amendment, argument, or evidence presented could not have been
submitted with the original filing.' 46 This change is critical because in
the patent application process, an applicant has two opportunities to
amend the patent claims for issuance. 147 Under the USPTO's former
practice, an applicant could prolong the application process by filing
140. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Ex-
amination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg.
1 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
141. MUELLER, supra note 67, at 163.
142. DeMatteis, supra note 129.
143. An applicant is prohibited from adding new matter to an application without re-
ceiving a new filing date for that new matter. Thus, if an applicant files an incomplete
application at the outset, the final application may be less complete because it would lack
essential matter not included in the original filing. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f) (2005).
144. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Ex-
amination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg.
1 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.112 (2005).
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multiple continuations, thus receiving numerous opportunities to
amend claims to the level of patentability. Under the reformed guide-
lines, a patent applicant has only two chances to amend an application
absent an adequate reason to allow the examination to continue. 148
Thus, the initially filed application must be as close to patentability as
possible. The fear that the first-to-file system would elicit an onslaught
of poorly drafted patent applications in an attempt to be the first in
line is mitigated by the fact that a poorly drafted patent application
would be less likely to be issued under the new guidelines.
2. Myth #2: The First-to-File System Will Harm Independent
Inventors
Opponents of the first-to-file system argue that it will harm inde-
pendent inventors. 149 Independent inventors often have limited re-
sources compared to large companies, and it is argued that, under a
first-to-file system, independent inventors will be at a disadvantage be-
cause they lack the necessary capital to quickly file a patent applica-
tion.150 In spite of these arguments, the perceived advantage of the
first-to-invent system-and the perceived inequity of the first-to-file
system-cannot be reconciled with statistical evidence indicating that
independent inventors are, in fact, not benefited by the current
system.
Contrary to the arguments of small entities, scholars have hailed
the current first-to-invent system as unfair to independent inventors
and small entities due to its costs and complexities. 51 Under the first-
to-invent system, a challenge to priority may result in a costly interfer-
ence proceeding, where the party challenging inventorship must show
by clear and convincing evidence that they are the first inventor.152
Due to the complex rules governing the current priority determina-
148. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Ex-
amination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg.
1 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
149. DeMatteis, supra note 129. Those in favor of maintaining the first-to-invent system
include parties considered to be small entities: individual inventors, small businesses, and
non-profit organizations. 35 C.F.R. § 1.27(a) (2000) (defining small entities).
150. A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 77, at 126 (recognizing the
concern that small inventors may be disadvantaged); DeMatteis, supra note 129 (discussing
the limited resources of small inventors).
151. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prperty United
States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. on H.R. 2795 "Patent Act of 2005, "109th Cong.
10 (2005) [hereinafter Griswold, Hearing] (statement of Gary Griswold, past President of
the American Intellectual Property Law Association).
152. See Enzo BioChem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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tions, inventors must present proof of inventorship. This proof re-
quires detailed data from previous years regarding conception and
reduction to practice. 153 Small entities without knowledge of the pat-
ent laws at the time of inventorship often do not have the records to
support their inventorship dates. 154 The limited resources of small in-
ventors pose a hindrance under the current priority system given the
costly litigation associated with interference proceedings. The median
cost for the discovery phase of an interference proceeding alone was
$113,000 in 2005.155 Many small entities do not have the financial re-
sources or sophisticated understanding of patent law to adequately
protect themselves.1 56 For this reason, large companies will use the
interference proceeding as a sword to challenge the priority of small
entities. 157 Since an entire interference proceeding can cost upwards
of $500,000, many small entities are forced to license their patents to
large companies capable of supporting the costs of defending
inventorship. 158
Due to the difficulty in overcoming a patent's presumption of va-
lidity, priority proceedings under the first-to-invent system do not nec-
essarily grant priority to the first party to invent. 159 The difficulty is a
result of both the cost of proceedings and the high level of proof re-
quired to show inventorship. Furthermore, the party asserting in-
ventorship against a patent holder must show by clear and convincing
evidence that they are the first party to invent.160 Since many small
entities do not have adequate records supporting their inventorship
dates, meeting the standard of clear and convincing evidence is very
difficult. 161 Thus, a small entity challenging inventorship may actually
be the first to invent, but still be denied priority due to the difficulty of
overcoming the presumption of validity. 162
Furthermore, interference proceedings may actually stifle the in-
novation that the patent system seeks to promote. 63 During an inter-
ference proceeding, inventors are called away from their work to
153. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
154. Jackman, supra note 15, at 83.
155. Griswold, Hearing, supra note 151, at 10.
156. Jackman, supra note 15, at 83.
157. Griswold, Hearing, supra note 151, at 10 (citing to Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V.
Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary , 54 HASNGs L.J. 1299 (2003)).
158. Merz & Henry, supra note 109, at 154.
159. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Griswold, Hearing, supra note 151, at 10.
160. See Enzo BioChem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
161. SeeJackman, supra note 15, at 83.
162. 35 U.S.C. § 282. "A patent shall be presumed valid." Id.
163. Gholz, First-to-File, supra note 117, at 894-95.
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spend time trying to recall historical information regarding dates of
conception and reduction to practice. 164 While these inventors are try-
ing to recall dates from years past, they are not working toward the
innovation encouraged by the United States patent system. Charles
Gholz provides a compelling example of this problem from personal
experience:
A couple of years ago I was handling a big ticket interference in
which my side's inventors were named the Inventors of the Year by
the Intellectual Property Owners Association. At about the same
time, my client assigned the lead inventor to us full time. That is, it
told him that it was more important for him to work with us to win
the interference than it was for him to work at his laboratory bench
making more inventions!
My client's decision was good for us, but it was grotesquely bad for
the nation. While the inventor spent his time racking his brain try-
ing to remember what he had done and when he had done it years
before (and more importantly, trying to find documents to sub-
stantiate his hazy memory), he could have been back at his bench
making more important inventions.165
Removing an inventor from work for interference discovery could
be more harmful to small entities that have a smaller research and
development department than a large company. Taking away even
one inventor for interference litigation would deplete the resources of
a small entity more than the removal of a single inventor on the daily
operations of a large company. In the biotechnology industry, many
new drugs are discovered by start-up companies. 166 At the same time,
mergers among existing biotechnology firms are taking place, creat-
ing large companies with large research and development pro-
grams. 167 The detrimental effects of removing an inventor from a
start-up company are even more pronounced when the potential com-
petition is a company able to sacrifice the efforts of a single inventor
without losing considerable research time.
If the United States moves to a first-to-file system, the problems
associated with interference proceedings will be eliminated, and small
164. Id.
165. Id. at 894-95.
166. John K. Borchardt, The Business of Pharmacogenomics, 4 MOD. DRUG DiscoVERY 35
(2001), available at http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/ournals/mdd/v04/iO7/html/07
borchardt.html ("Of the 50 firms with a single new drug approval during the 1990s, for 41
firms, this was their first-ever new drug approval. Many of these are startup firms, often
biotechnology companies .... [A]dvances in biomedical science may have fostered less
concentration of new drug development among existing firms and stimulated new entry to
the industry.").
167. Id.
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inventors will not have to worry about losing time and money in an
interference proceeding. It is natural for concerns to arise when
changes are proposed to a system that has been in place for over a
century. The concerns pronounced by first-to-file opponents, how-
ever, are ultimately unpersuasive in light of the benefits offered by a
first-to-file system.
IV. Conclusion
The constitutional purpose of the United States patent system is
the promotion of progress in the useful arts. The most effective means
of accomplishing this goal is to ensure a high level of certainty of pro-
tection coupled with the encouragement of early public disclosure.
Certainty ensures that inventors will have the strongest protection and
will be encouraged to patent future inventions, while early public dis-
closure allows the public to build on innovations.
The first-to-file system of patent priority fulfills the constitutional
goals of the patent system by promoting early public disclosure and
providing for greater certainty in patent protection. The first-to-file
system would positively impact the biotechnology industry, as the na-
ture of the industry is such that certainty in patent protection is essen-
tial. Biotechnology companies rely almost entirely on their patent
protection to gain investor support and remain viable. The first-to-file
system ensures certainty in priority of inventorship, protecting patent
holders from challenges to patent validity by unknown prior inventors
who failed to disclose their invention to the public.
The concerns surrounding a movement to a first-to-file system are
outdated and unfounded because other changes to the patent proce-
dures have adequately addressed the concerns. Furthermore, the be-
lief that independent inventors will be harmed under a first-to-file
system is sharply contrasted against the reality that independent in-
ventors currently suffer under the first-to-invent system of priority.
The first-to-file priority system conforms to the patent goals as set
forth in the United States Constitution and greatly benefits the bio-
technology industry. As one of the fastest growing and most innovative
industries in existence, the biotechnology sector requires strong pat-
ent protection to maximize innovation.
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